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Asymmetrical Power between Internet Giants and Users in China 
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We find that the asymmetry of power between the Internet giants and the 
users, prevalent in the digital era, is deeply problematic in China in that the 
two key players of big data – the Internet giants and the government – are 
interested in exploiting the potential of big data, but the regulation of the use 
and application of user data is an obstacle to their goal. The Internet giants do 
not value the provision of transparent privacy policies and the enforcement of 
the policies, while the government, being an investor and consumer of big data 
services, has neither the interest nor the technological capability to regulate 
big data technology. Moreover, there is no unified Internet governance system 
to solicit cooperation within the government to regulate Internet privacy. 
These contextual characteristics facilitate the building of the social credit 
system that pays limited attention to user privacy. The findings suggest that in 
the discussion about the political consequences of ICT development in China, 
we should focus on the Internet giants and their unchecked technological 
power instead of only the government.  
 
Keywords: big data, Chinese Internet giants, Internet privacy, social credit 
system 
 
The recent Cambridge Analytica scandal—the use and application of data from up to 
87 million Facebook users’ in political campaigns, without their explicit consent—has 
vividly demonstrated the political power of the Internet companies with big data technology 
(BBC, 2018). The scandal has made people in Western liberal democracies aware of the risks 
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posed to the public when the Internet companies grow too powerful with their access to and 
application of big data. Yet, while discussing the political impact of information 
communication technology (ICT) in China, scholars and observers tend to focus 
predominantly on the role of the government in using the big data technology for censorship 
and surveillance and overlook the power of the Internet giants in China who own and apply 
the ICT.  
 
The power of the Internet giants comes from their collection, storage and use of user 
data, and the growing popularity of Internet services in China in recent years has provided the 
Internet giants tremendous amount of user data, making them as powerful as their Western 
counterparts, if not more so. As of December 2017, the Internet penetration rate in China was 
55.8%, more than the global average of 51.7%. Of the 772 million Internet users in China, 
93.3% use instant messengers, 68.8% use smartphone payments instead of cash or bank cards 
for offline purchasing, 69.1% use e-commerce, and 44% use WeChat or Alipay for e-
government services, such as social insurance, health insurance, tax, public transportation, 
and utility bills (CNNIC, 2018).  In this article, we will illustrate the unregulated collection, 
usage and application of user data by the Internet giants and explain why this poses risks to 
the rights of the users who produce the data.  
 
What risks can the use and application of big data by the Internet giants pose to the 
users? While people enjoy the convenience facilitated by the Internet giants, and these giants 
enjoy ever-growing power and profits, few are aware of the potential privacy threats that 
Internet giants’ collection and analysis of personal information pose to Chinese citizens. The 
notion of privacy indicates one’s interpersonal boundary-control processes (Altman, 1975). 
However, with increasing portions of our social, communicative and commercial acts taking 
place online, we leave digital records that are stored by and accessible to Internet giants 
(Tufekci, 2008). The privacy threats arise when digital records are controlled and used by the 
Internet giants and users are no longer able to control their privacy.  
 
Furthermore, with ICT development, the Internet giants are empowered with various 
tools, such as data mining, association rule learning, and a priori algorithms (e.g., Fayyad, 
Piatetsky-Shapiro, & Smyth, 1996; Puschmann & Burgess, 2014). With these tools, the giants 
can not only analyze user data but also manipulate and filter information for commercial 
gains. This creates an asymmetry of power between the Internet giants who collect and use 
the data, and the users who produce the data. Access to user data and big data technology 
allow Internet giants to decide users’ access to information and knowledge, which affects 
people’s real-life choices. Although the asymmetrical power between Internet companies and 
users is prevalent in the digital age, we argue in this article that the problem is deeply 





Relying on interviews with 29 ICT experts, social science scholars, and government 
officials,2 we focus on two key players of big data technology—the Internet giants and the 
government—and examine the contextual characteristics in China that have allowed the 
giants to exploit user data with very limited restrictions, aggravating the asymmetry of power 
between Internet giants and users. We find that on ICT development, the government and the 
Internet giants are currently allies, as ICT development can sustain economic growth and 
technology development for the government, and bring revenues to the Internet giants. Thus, 
at present, both the Internet giants and the government have limited interest in regulating 
Internet privacy. Moreover, the government also lacks the technological capability and a 
unified Internet governance system to regulate Internet privacy. These contextual 
characteristics facilitate the building of the social credit system that pays limited attention to 
user privacy.  
 
Regarding case selection, we choose Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (hereafter, BAT)— 
the biggest Chinese Internet giants—as the main cases of the Internet giants in China for two 
reasons. First, they are not only the largest Internet service providers in terms of annual 
profits and the number of active users in China, but are also the most important digital 
players of the Chinese economy and ICT development. BAT are three of the world's top ten 
largest Internet corporations in terms of revenue and market capitalization. By the end of 
2017, the market capitalization of BAT took 73.9% of total market capitalization of Chinese 
listed Internet companies (CNNIC, 2018). Moreover, BAT not only develop their own 
technology but also invest in ICT development. In 2016, BAT provided 42% of all venture 
capital investment in China. In comparison, Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, and Google together 
contributed 5% of venture capital investment in the United States in the same year. One in 
every five top Chinese start-ups is founded by BAT, and an additional 30 percent of them 
receive funding from BAT (Woetzel et al., 2017). 
 
Second, the ability of the Internet giants to collect, use and apply big data depends on 
their business model. And the business model of BAT—attracting users to stay on their 
platforms for every aspect of their lives—enables BAT to collect user data covering all areas 
of online and offline activities, and to build a large user base for the use and application of 
big data. This serves the research purpose of this article: investigation of the unregulated use 
of user data by Internet companies in China. Unlike the Internet corporations in the U.S. that 
tend to specialize in a few core businesses—e.g. Twitter in micro-blogging and Uber in ride 
sharing—BAT are expanding their businesses vertically and horizontally into various areas 
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that closely link both online business and offline local services, and offer users a one-stop 
shop for a wide variety of services including health, information, entertainment, e-commerce 
and social interactions. This creates a multifaceted and multi-industry digital ecosystem (Jia 
& Kenney, 2016). As such, the Chinese are increasingly reliant on these all-in-one super apps 
for managing their daily activities, enabling BAT to have access to tens of millions of pieces 
of user data. 
 
This article proceeds as follows. We begin with a review of literature on the power of 
ICT in China and outline the contributions of this article, followed by an examination of the 
asymmetrical power between Internet companies and users in the digital era. In the fourth 
section, we provide empirical evidence to illustrate the practices of information manipulation 
and filtering conducted by the Internet giants in China. Then, we examine the four contextual 
characteristics in China that have aggravated the digital divide between Internet giants and 
users, and the building of social credit system is used as an example to illustrate these 
contextual characteristics. Finally, the article concludes with implications and avenues for 
future research. 
 
The Power of Information Communication Technologies in China 
 
As ICT and the Internet have become important communication tools, scholars have 
acknowledged the political impact of ICT on the state and the citizens in China. Earlier 
scholarship has emphasized the efforts by the Chinese government to develop online 
censorship techniques. In China, an extensive system of Internet surveillance and control has 
been built to control information flow. The system includes the building of a government-
controlled gateway to channel international connections to the global Internet (Boas, 2006), 
the regulation of privately owned and operated Internet platforms and telecommunications 
networks (Mackinnon, 2011), and the construction of a hierarchical structure of Internet 
regulation and a system of punishment mechanisms directed at various actors in the networks 
(Qiu, 2000).  
 
Increasingly, the Chinese government has moved toward adopting softer and subtler 
methods of online control. The government hires online troops to fabricate support and 
distract attention away from controversial issues (Han, 2015; King, Pan, & Roberts, 2017; 
Miller, 2016). Online space has also been used by party officials to gather information about 
public opinion (Qiang, 2011), to receive feedback on policies and respond to public opinion 
strategically (Chen, Pan, & Xu, 2016), and to inform official media or identify and neutralize 





While much of the current discussion on the power of ICT in China has concentrated 
on the use of ICT for informational and communicative activities, and how the informational 
and communicative functions of ICT empower the government, here we consider the 
commercial function of ICT as well as the other two functions in our analysis of the power 
and political impact of BAT. This shift of focus is particularly relevant to the development of 
ICT and the new trend that people are increasingly using the Internet not only for 
informational and communicative activities but also for commercial activities—purchasing 
products online, for example. This is the first contribution of the article.  
 
The second contribution is to shift the current discussion on the power of ICT in 
China from the government to the Internet giants. Thus far, the discussion has focused on the 
former, especially its ability to co-opt the Internet giants for surveillance and censorship. Yet, 
the relatively powerful interests in the use and application of big data include not only the 
government, but also Internet giants who have direct access to and control of the big data. We 
know very little about the power of the Internet giants in China and its impact on Internet 
users.  
 
The Asymmetrical Power between Internet Companies and Users in the Digital Age 
 
Though there is limited discussion on the asymmetry of power between Internet 
companies and users in China, the impact of the application of big data on users has been 
widely discussed by communication scholars in other contexts. Big data refers to a capacity 
to search, aggregate, store and cross-reference large data sets (boyd & Crawford, 2012).  
There are three specific characteristics of big data—the amount of data, the speed of data and 
the range of data types/sources—which require advanced technical approaches and skills to 
store and make use of it (Curry, 2016). These challenges create a digital divide between the 
big data rich and the big data poor (boyd & Crawford, 2012). More specifically, the digital 
divide represents the asymmetrical power between the relatively small group of privileged 
companies that have the means to collect data, and the expertise to analyze data, and the large 
group of Internet users who create the data (Manovich, 2012). The threat to user privacy and 
the asymmetrical power between Internet companies and users is exacerbated by the 
companies’ application of data mining, data sorting, and targeting.   
 
In the data-mining process, the digital divide mainly concerns access to information, 
data and technology. Data mining is the process of surveilling data and discerning 
unexpected and unanticipated correlations behind the massive amount of human online 
activities (Andrejevic, 2014). There are two problems behind data mining. First, it involves 
surveillance and monitoring of citizens’ online data. The boundary between surveillance for a 




any government can also be a customer of the Internet companies and purchase the 
surveillance and monitoring services. Snowden’s revelations have shown that government 
agencies in Western liberal democracies are also mining and digging into data that users 
share with the commercial Internet companies (Greenwald, 2014). As Garton-Ash concludes 
(2013), “were Big Brother to come back in the 21st century, he would return as a public-
private partnership”. Second, interpretation is an essential element of data analysis, which is 
subject to limitation and bias (boyd & Crawford, 2012). With the Internet giants dominating 
the mining and analyzing of user data, the analysis and interpretation of the human online 
data might well be biased toward the interests and viewpoints of the privileged Internet 
companies, and disempower the users.  
 
In the data sorting and targeting process, the digital divide goes beyond access to data 
and technology, concerning access to useful knowledge and impacting on people’s life 
choices (Andrejevic, 2014; Lyon, 2003). Data sorting and targeting is a process of creating 
and reinforcing social divisions or even digital discrimination (Lyon, 2003). Raw data are 
sorted based on a set of criteria decided by and only known to the Internet companies; based 
on classified information, Internet companies can predict user preferences and feed users with 
information they think those users want. This personalization process creates the so-called 
“filter bubble”, which can introduce a new form of invisible propaganda, indoctrinating users 
with their own ideas, and amplifying users’ desire for things that they are familiar with 
(Pariser, 2011). This new form of invisible propaganda can be used by governments for 
political purposes, as well as by commercial corporations for commercial purposes. Because 
of personalization, the effect of propaganda might be more persuasive as it appears subtler 
and less artificial.  
 
In sorting and targeting, based on probabilistic predictions taking into account both 
individual and aggregate level data over time, the Internet companies decide who gets access 
to what knowledge or information in what form. Moreover, in the process of selecting 
information, governments or commercial corporations can purchase influence. Thus, the 
asymmetry runs deep in that it creates “a divide between the kinds of useful ‘knowledge’ 
available to those with and without access to the database” (Andrejevic, 2014, p.1677), and 
can have real effects on people’s life chances (Lyon, 2003).  
 
Next, we explain the practices of information manipulation and filtering by the 
Internet giants in China that create the asymmetry of power between the giants and the users. 
 





Similar to their Western counterparts, Internet giants in China manipulate and filter 
information and create the “filter bubble”. One typical example is the customized news 
delivery by online news aggregators. Jinri Toutiao is a very popular online news aggregator 
in China. As an engineer of big data in Baidu revealed: 
 
Jinri Toutiao claims to be an intelligent news portal that selects and feeds 
news to users based on user needs. Counting on Jinri Toutiao to select and 
feed news means that users transfer their rights of information selection to the 
app. As long as you use the app to read news, it will always select what it 
wants you to see. For instance, Jinri Toutiao always puts official propaganda 
news of President Xi at the top of the news list. Did you choose to read it? No! 
That is because it wants you to see it. 3 
 
In this case, the political intention of the government is featured in the personalization 
of news information.  
 
The sorting and targeting of information can also be affected by commercial purposes. 
Deleting negative news and information about a brand is a typical marketing strategy in the 
digital marketing field. Depending on the difficulty of deletion and the popularity of social 
media sites, the price of deleting negative information ranges from $15 (¥100) to $750 
(¥5000) per post (Wu, 2013). Censoring negative information is quite often requested by 
celebrities and companies to cover up negative news that can influence their reputation or 
stock prices. A senior manager of a private Internet company provided an example:  
 
Social media are able to arrange the content in the way they want. Otherwise 
how could those celebrities, officials, and companies cover up their scandals, 
such as cheatings, corruption, and other negative news? A few months ago, 
when pictures showing that XXX [a Chinese movie star] cheated on his wife 
was exposed on the Internet, do you know how much he paid for Weibo to 
cover up and how much he paid for online troops to “clean” him? ... We didn’t 
delete all the discussions of this issue, because it takes too much effort. We 
just disabled any “#” related to this so it wouldn’t be promoted to the front 
page as a “hot topic”. In the meantime, we promoted other news, such as 
soccer and Adele’s new songs. Eventually, public attention shifted, because 
people forget things very easily. We use the same technical methods to deal 
with any information requested by a third party. 4 
 
3 Interview with B003, engineer of big data, Baidu, 2017/05, telephone.  





In this case, information is covered up and the commercial online troops are hired to 
fabricate support and distract attention away from the negative information for commercial 
companies and celebrities. The fifty cents parties documented by political science scholars 
(Han, 2015; King et al., 2017; Miller, 2016) do not seem to differ much from the commercial 
online troops in this example.  
 
On search engines, companies can pay to have their results ranked high in the search 
results. Baidu sells the listings to bidders (jingjia paiming) who pay the highest prices, 
without vetting the claims or products. As a Baidu manager revealed: “our main task is to 
earn profit for Baidu. We don’t have authority or expertise to judge whether the ads are real 
or not.”5 False claims made by a hospital appearing on a Baidu search result, for example, 
indirectly caused the death of a young college student in China (BBC, 2016). Although this is 
an extreme case, given that people are increasing relying on the Internet to acquire 
information, the selection of “useful” information by the Internet companies has tremendous 
impact on people’s real-life decisions.  
 
Although the asymmetry of power between the Internet giants and the users in China 
shown above does not differ much from the same conflict in developed, Western countries, 
we will demonstrate below why the privacy risks posed by the Internet giants’ application of 
big data is worse in China. Existing scholarship on privacy concerns tends to paint China as 
an exceptional case where, for historical and cultural reasons, the public lacks privacy 
concerns (Farrall, 2008; McDougall & Hansson, 2002). Yet, empirical investigations reveal 
that Chinese Internet users are not much different from users elsewhere in the world 
regarding the relationship between privacy concerns and information disclosure online. 
Studies of users of social network sites, such as Facebook and Myspace, found no association 
between privacy concerns and users’ decision to join Facebook and to reveal personal 
information  (Acquisti & Gross, 2006; Tufekci, 2008). Similarly, a survey study of Weibo 
users in China reveals that information disclosure is strongly related to user perception of 
benefits they can gain from the online media, while it has no association with their privacy 
concerns (Zhang, Amos, & Pentina, 2015). Therefore, public perception of privacy is not the 
reason for the aggravated Internet privacy violations in China.  
 
Instead, we focus on the two key players of big data in China, the Internet giants and 
the government, and examine the contextual characteristics that have allowed the exploitation 
of user data. We start by looking at the lack of transparent privacy policies and enforcement 
of the policies by the Internet giants.  
 





The Lack of Transparent Privacy Policies and the Enforcement of the Policies 
 
Although popular online websites were launched in China in the early 2000s, the first 
national assessment of privacy policies of Internet products and services was carried out and 
released more than a decade later, in 2017. This annual report illustrated the prevalence of 
poor transparency in the privacy policies of websites and apps in China (Nandu Personal 
Data Protection Research Centre, 2017). In their assessment of the privacy policies of the 
most popular 1550 Chinese websites and apps, more than 80% ranked low or relatively low 
in privacy policy transparency. Common problems in the 'low' or 'relatively low' ranks are a 
lack of user rights' clauses, the use of standardized and older versions of privacy texts that 
fail to reflect the services provided or to protect users’ rights, and having terms that allows 
Internet giants to sell user data for commercial purposes without asking for user consent. 
What is worse, there are also a few websites and apps that do not have any privacy policies.  
 
The assessment concerns only the contents of privacy policies. Yet, to deal with the 
threat to user privacy, the implementation and enforcement of privacy policies is much more 
important. As the annual report has pointed out, how Internet giants implement their privacy 
policies, especially on issues such as how to share user information with third parties, and 
how to deal with user data of unregistered users, remains unknown.  
 
Installing mechanisms to regulate and enforce the collection, storage and use of user 
data is not a concern of the Chinese Internet giants. In March 2018, in a discussion about user 
privacy at a China development forum with IBM CEO and Google CEO, Baidu CEO Robin 
Li claimed that Chinese users are less concerned about privacy and more willing to trade 
personal privacy for the greater convenience offered by Internet services and products than 
users in the West (The Beijing News, 2018). This claim triggered a heated debate online and 
received a lot of criticism from Internet users in China, demonstrating that the claim is no 
more than an excuse used by the Internet giants to justify their lack of user privacy protection 
policies. For the majority of Internet giants in China, their priority is to collect as much user 
data as possible and decide about what and how to use this data later (Yang, 2018).  
 
Lack of Government Interest in Regulating Internet Privacy 
 
 The most important reason that exacerbates the abuse of user data by Internet giants 
is the lack of government interest in regulating their access to, management of and use of user 
data. The Chinese government is an investor and consumer of big data services. And the 




A report by McKinsey on digital development in China noted: “The government gave digital 
players space to experiment before enacting official regulation, and is now becoming an 
active supporter” (Woetzel et al., 2017, p.13). During the early stage of Internet development, 
digital players did enjoy considerable space for development and innovation. For instance, 
the first online payment service was launched by Taobao (Alibaba’s e-commerce website) in 
2003 and it was not until 2010 that The People’s Bank of China started to regulate it through 
the first regulation, “Non-financial Institutions Payment Service Management Measures” 
(The People’s Bank of China, 2010). Consequently, between 2003 and 2010, Taobao had 
considerable leeway to develop its e-commerce business, collect user data and use the data to 
innovate its payment services (Woetzel et al., 2017). A previous Ministry of Information and 
Information Technology (MIIT) officer also attributed the wild growth and expansion of the 
Chinese Internet companies in the first decade of the 21st century to the fact that the 
government imposes very limited restrictions on the digital players.6 
 
Nowadays, the government has become an active supporter of digital players by 
promoting the digital economy and ICT development. A series of policies have been issued to 
develop and strengthen ICT as a new engine for economic growth. For instance, in 2015, the 
government unveiled a national development plan, “Internet Plus”, the key of which is to 
keep pace with the information trend and utilize Internet development to boost economic 
development (State Council, 2015). The development plan came with a series of detailed 
action plans that integrate the Internet, cloud computing, big data, logistics, social security, 
consumer industry, and manufacturing. In 2017, China Internet Investment Fund, a state-
owned venture capital fund, planned to invest $15.89 billion (¥100 billion) in Chinese 
Internet companies (Woetzel et al., 2017). As can be seen, the Chinese government’s 
priorities and interests lie in helping Internet giants to develop digital technology for 
economic growth. And ICT development relies on the collection, storage and use of user data. 
Thus, there is little incentive for the government to rein in the use and application of big data 
for the sake of user privacy.  
 
The Chinese government’s lack of interest in protecting user privacy is also illustrated 
by actions taken by responsible ministries and party organs. For example, in September 2010, 
Qihoo360, the biggest Chinese Internet security company known for its antivirus software, 
accused QQ, an instant messenger from Tencent, of spying on and scanning its users' 
computers for personal data. Tencent fought back and accused Qihoo360 of fabricated news 
and illicit competition. Although part of the dispute was related to the collection and use of 
users' personal information, the MIIT, which is directly in charge of Internet development, 
 
6 Interview with A009, CEO of a Fintech company, then official of the MIIT, and then senior 




only intervened in the dispute in regards to illicit market competition. The solution provided 
by MIIT in November 2010 solely focused on how to regulate the competition between the 
two companies but made no mention of how to protect user privacy (MIIT, 2010).  
 
This reveals the government’s interest in ICT development, which it considers as a 
new engine for sustainable economic growth. Allowing the Chinese Internet giants to explore 
the potential of big data technology is key to this vision. Thus, as it stands, the Chinese 
government is unlikely to regulate Internet privacy for the sake of user personal information 
security, as this would stifle the growth of Internet giants in China.   
 
The Chinese Government’s Lack of Technological Capability  
       
   The fact that the Chinese government has been successful in soliciting the 
cooperation of the Internet giants in developing and applying ICT for censorship and 
surveillance has made scholars and observers overestimate the government's technological 
capability. As we will show, it is the Internet corporations that build the Internet tools and 
develop big data and algorithms; it is also the corporations that execute and implement 
censorship and surveillance on behalf of the Chinese government. The government does not 
have the skills in and knowledge on big data, or the working manner and mind-set to develop 
and manage such data, preventing it from regulating the big data use of the Internet giants. In 
other words, the Chinese government lacks the technological capability to regulate big data 
technology.  
 
Realizing the importance of big data and the information industry, the Chinese 
government has built a few big data centers, such as the Guiyang Platform for Big Data 
Transaction Services (built in April 2015). Government departments and state-owned 
corporations also sponsor or create state-led institutions and projects for big data research, 
such as the Beijing Institute of Big Data Research. Yet, the building of these institutes and 
projects is often only to please higher-level government and to receive government funding. 
Staff working in these state-led or state-owned centers have neither skills in nor knowledge 
on big data. The Guiyang big data center is a typical example. An engineer of a state-owned 
telecom corporation revealed:  
 
Do you know how my company decided to build the big data research center? 
When President Xi visited Guiyang center [Guiyang platform for Big Data 
Transaction Services], he said “Big data is really important”. The executive of 
my company saw it as an opportunity to join a project strongly promoted by 
the government, especially since “Internet Plus” is such a hot concept. He then 




because my company has the capability to collect big data or analyze it, or has 
a detailed plan to develop big data technology. It is just because it’s a 
government-led project and my company wants to share some profit. … 
Moreover, the center is now led by officials appointed by upper-level leaders 
instead of engineers. How could a political official analyze big data? As an 
engineer, it is difficult for me to explain to them what big data is, to say 
nothing about the complicated computer technology. 7 
 
Because of a lack of skills and knowledge on big data technology, the Guiyang big 
data center has currently ended up being primarily a center for storing big data, with limited 
data storage capacity.  
 
Another major problem faced by the state-owned or state-led data centers is the 
bureaucratic working manner and mind-set. In these data centers, staff strive to follow orders 
from above, instead of focusing on developing technology and innovating big data analysis to 
satisfy user needs. The fact that the Guiyang center was built to attract funding from the 
government has also vividly demonstrated this problem. A senior engineer of the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences revealed the difference between the Internet giants and the government 
in terms of developing and managing big data technology:  
 
Compared with BAT, state-owned companies and data centers do not base the 
development of technology on market demands, and they also do not have the 
capability to apply technology in practice. If you check the programs of all 
conferences on advanced technology in China, you will find that most 
advanced technology is developed by BAT. In other words, BAT are far more 
advanced than the state-owned companies and the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences on technology development. 8 
 
As can be seen, the Chinese government does not have the skills in and knowledge on 
big data, or the working manner and mind-set to develop and manage big data. This weakness 
has prevented the government from regulating the use and application of big data. The 
technological know-how for big data technology is predominantly possessed by the Internet 
giants. The Chinese government has the big data vision, but does not have the skills, 
knowledge or mind-set. The example of real name registration illustrates the difference 
 
7 Interview with B009, engineer of a state-own telecom company, 2017/06, Taiyuan.  
8 Interview with B011, senior engineer of Chinese Academy of Sciences, then engineer of 




between the government and the Internet giants in their technological capability. An engineer 
of big data at Sohu revealed:  
 
10 years ago, when the Chinese government started to call for real name 
registration on the Internet, people were reluctant to do it. However, nowadays 
when Ali or WeChat says “register with your real name, you will get a bonus 
or have access to advanced functions of the apps”, people are eager to do so 
voluntarily. You tell me which is more powerful: the government or the 
companies.9 
 
This example demonstrates that using ICT technology, the Internet giants are able to 
incentivize users and achieve real-name registration on the Internet, while the government 
cannot.  
 
Fragmented Internet governance system 
 
Fragmentation of Internet governance within the central government and across 
different regions and areas of China makes it difficult to build collaboration on Internet 
privacy regulation, and is another major obstacle to a unified effort on big data regulation. At 
the central level, departments are assigned different and conflicting responsibilities related to 
the Internet, making it difficult for them to cooperate on Internet privacy regulation. The 
Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC),10  headed by the CCP General Secretary Xi 
Jinping, is in charge of censorship, oversight, and regulation formulation and implementation 
on a variety of issues related to the Chinese Internet; while the State Council and its 
department, the MIIT, is in charge of Internet development, such as infrastructure, business 
registration, and technological development. The government wants to boost economic 
development by promoting Internet development on the one hand, but wants to maintain 
stability by controlling information on the Internet on the other (Lee & Lio, 2016). Quite 
often, these two aims are conflicting, but they are assigned to these two organizations at the 
central level with the CAC responsible for maintaining stability and the State Council for 
economic development. The disagreement between these two organs at the central level 
regarding their aims makes it difficult for them to cooperate on regulating Internet privacy.  
 
Even though the CAC has grown considerable enforcement power since 2014, 
regulating Internet privacy is not its priority. Since 2014, the CAC has been centralizing 
 
9 Interview with B014, engineer of big data at Sohu, 2017/06, Beijing. 
10 The CAC is also known as the Office of the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs 
and directly answers to the Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization. 




power on various issues related to the Chinese Internet from other departments, including 
taking away the enforcement power possessed by the MIIT. However, the CAC’s priority lies 
in censoring contents on the Chinese Internet. For instance, in July 2016, the CAC closed 
some news programs on Tencent and other news sites because of the publication of a large 
amount of independently-gathered news reports (Beijing Times, 2016). In September 2017, 
the CAC fined Tencent, Baidu, and Weibo “for hosting fake news, pornography and other 
forms of banned content” (CAC Beijing City Branch, 2017). When it comes to violation of 
user privacy, Internet giants only receive warnings from the MIIT. For example, in January 
2018, the MIIT warned Baidu, Ant Finance (a personal financial investment management 
APP), and Jinri Toutiao for their inadequate provision data privacy measures to protect users’ 
privacy.  
 
The conflict of responsibilities and interests is further exacerbated downward to the 
local levels, making it hard for local governments to cooperate on Internet privacy regulation. 
While central governments want to ensure compliance with their orders, local governments 
want to maximize the benefits they receive from their administration in the local areas 
(Egorov & Sonin, 2011). For example, the disagreement between central and local 
governments has impeded the building of a website that displays credits for all companies 
instructed by State Council. The website requires sharing of companies’ information online 
by different levels of governments. But, this information is crucial for local governments to 
bargain for political and economic resources. A senior manager of government relations at 
Baidu revealed:  
 
This project has been going on for years, but it is still under-developed 
because some departments refuse to take part. The departments use the 
information to argue for financial and personnel resources, so they have to 
hold the information exclusively.11 
 
The development of e-governance demonstrates the fragmentation across different 
areas of China. The unequal Internet development across different areas, and the different 
motives of local government officials, make it impossible to build a comprehensive and 
universal e-governance system. As a CEO of a private Internet company revealed:  
 
Some counties in western China do not even have Automatic Office systems, 
while in some big cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen, people can 
almost do everything online. In some areas, e-governance is a priority of the 
local government. In these areas, even though the officials may not necessarily 
 




understand big data projects, they do it because of top-down orders or as a 
chance to apply for grants from upper level governments. In some other areas, 
the officials don’t take e-governance or big data seriously, so they don’t have 
the intention to build or use it. Some officials don’t know what they need from 
the system, so it is difficult for us to design and build it.12 
 
As can be seen, the fragmentation of Internet governance in Beijing and across 
different areas and regions in terms of interests and responsibilities has impeded 
collaboration within the government on Internet privacy regulation.  
 
The Social Credit System and Chinese Internet giants  
 
The building of the social credit system is a typical example that reflects the role of 
Internet giants in big data application. China’s social credit system is an information 
technology-driven ambition of the government, which aims to create a central repository of 
data on citizens and organizations for monitoring, assessing and changing their actions 
through carrots and sticks (Ohlberg, Ahmed, & Lang, 2017). It has been criticized by some 
Western observers and scholars for its potential to be used for political control. As some have 
claimed, the alliance of profit-driven private Internet companies with technological know-
how and an authoritarian government could make the social credit system an effective tool 
for “Big Brother”, to make compliant and patriotic citizens and prevent opposition (Clover, 
2016). Yet, from the above discussion, we can see that while the Chinese government is a 
consumer of and investor in the big data, the Internet giants have their own interests and 
privileged technology to address some profound social and economic problems via the social 
credit system. This has been neglected in the current discussion on the Chinese social credit 
system.  
  
From the perspective of the Internet giants, they are building the social credit system 
for their commercial interests. A senior manager of Alibaba research pointed out that there 
were some major problems in the Chinese banking system: limited traceable credit record of 
individuals and companies stored, excessive bank transaction and administration fees, and the 
low penetration of bank card payment services. “We [Alibaba] are just trying to fill in those 
gaps”. 13 In other words, the building of a social credit system is to address and solve these 
major problems in China’s banking system, and to achieve revenue for the Internet giants.  
 
 
12 Interview with B006, CEO of a government big data project contractor, 2017/05, 
Hangzhou.  




An important reason for assigning a social credit rating to every citizen is to build an 
inclusive finance system that will provide financial support including loans to individuals 
from lower social classes, and to small companies for business development. Small and 
medium companies in China, for example, either have no access to financial support from 
traditional banks or have to pay higher costs to get a loan. An interviewee explained how the 
social credit system could include individuals and companies deprived of access to financial 
support: 
 
When we try to give loans to small and medium companies, for example, we 
have no place to check their credit system and financial records; even if banks 
have the records, they refuse to share the information with us … Thus, before 
the government authorized eight Internet companies to build a social credit 
system, we [Alibaba] had already noticed the strong demand to build our own 
credit system based on our user data and algorithms. Our intention is to build 
an individual’s credit history based on their expenditure, rather than income, 
because we can rely on our e-commerce platform to gather their consumption 
history. In this way, we also do not need to rely on the banking system to 
collaborate with us and provide us with information. 14 
 
However, in the building of a social credit system, the government and the Internet 
giants have different expectations. The government intends to first allow Internet giants to 
pilot rating schemes and then merge these pilot rating schemes and the data into a 
comprehensive central-level system (Hornby, 2017). Currently, every Internet giant is 
experimenting what it can do technically with its data and algorithms with limited restrictions. 
“If the regulation does not explicitly state that doing something is illegal, then it is legal for 
us to do it.”15 This is precisely the current status of the regulation of the social credit system 
in China. There is no explicit restriction on how the Internet giants apply user data in building 
the social credit system, and thus they have space to push the boundaries of big data 
technology.   
 
According to a senior manager of Alibaba, building this comprehensive central-level 
repository of data is not the Internet giants’ intention. Rather, their intention is to have several 
companies offering different credit systems and providing users with choices.16 As can be 
seen, the government relies heavily on the Internet giants’ technological know-how to build 
such a comprehensive state-owned credit system, while it is not in the Internet giants’ interest 
 
14 Ibid 





to build one system and transfer the ownership to the government. Because of the reluctance 
of the Internet giants to share data with rival platforms, the People's Bank of China decided 
not to issue any more licenses for the social credit system pilot in 2017 (Hornby, 2017). 
 
Furthermore, it is also practically difficult to merge data from different Internet 
companies into one platform. As a CEO of a government big data project contractor explains:  
 
Different Internet companies hold different types of data, because they collect 
data in different ways. Therefore, with the current technology, it is practically 
difficult to merge all data from different companies into one platform. Even if 
people did it, it would be difficult to use the data. 17  
 
It is too early to speculate on the potential of the government to use such a system for 
political control. Conversely, in the commercial version of the social credit system 
envisioned by the Internet giants, they have the potential to make users enormously 
dependent on the products and services they offer, despite the lack of transparent privacy 
policies. Thus, the most prominent problem of China's social credit system(s) is the 
asymmetry of power between the Internet giants and the users, instead of the “Big Brother” 
problem as is believed.  
 
The analysis above demonstrates the following key points. First, the Internet giants' 
access to technology and data makes them indispensable digital players in the building of the 
social credit system. Second, the Internet giants' lack of (enforcement of) transparent privacy 
policies, and the lack of government interest in and capacity to regulate Internet privacy make 
it unlikely that there will be mechanisms built in to deal with data privacy risks. Third, given 
that the Chinese government relies on the Internet giants’ technological know-how to build 
the system, and the technological obstacles of merging different data into one central 
repository, it is too early to speculate and worry about the potential of the government to use 
such a system for political control. But, with limited regulation on the use and application of 
big data, the privileged access to and control of big data technology does provide the Internet 
giants considerable power to abuse user privacy and affect people’s real-life chances, putting 










We find that similar to Google and Facebook, the Internet giants in China also filter 
information and decide who gets access to what knowledge or information in what form, 
creating the “filter bubble”.  The asymmetry of power between the Internet giants and the 
users is even worse in China in that the two key players of big data—the Internet giants and 
the government—are interested in exploiting the potential of big data, but regulation of the 
use of user data may be an obstacle to their goal. The Internet giants do not value the 
provision of transparent privacy policies and the enforcement of such policies, while the 
government, being an investor and consumer of big data services, has neither the interest in 
nor the technological capability to regulate big data technology. Moreover, there is no unified 
Internet governance system to solicit cooperation within the central government and across 
different regions and areas of China to regulate Internet privacy. 
 
These contextual characteristics facilitate the building of a social credit system that 
pays little attention to Internet privacy. The case of the social credit system also demonstrates 
that the government relies on the Internet giants’ technological know-how to build a 
government-owned central data system, but the Internet giants share a different vision about 
the social credit system—namely, they desire a privatized credit system that offer users 
choices. The technical barriers to merge data collected by different companies and 
government organs into one system and standardize them also pose great obstacles to 
building the central system envisioned by the government. Thus, it is too early to worry about 
the “Big Brother” problem, while the more prominent problem of the social credit system(s) 
is the widening digital divide between the Internet giants and users.  
 
There are two important caveats in interpreting the findings of this article. First, we 
do not suggest that the “Big Brother” problem, commonly discussed by international 
observers and scholars, does not exist in China. The Chinese government can certainly use its 
political power to control the Internet giants if they become too technologically powerful. 
However, given that the Chinese government and the Internet giants are allies on economic 
and ICT development, it is unlikely that the government will strictly control the Internet 
giants through hard political means (e.g. shutting them down). Second, though we do not 
preclude the possibility of future regulation of Internet privacy by the Chinese government —
with a change of interest, technological capability, and governance system—we have focused 
our analysis on the current stage of ICT development. We find that the protection of user 
privacy in the collection, storage, analysis and usage of user data, which would impede the 
exploration of big data potential, is currently of concern to neither the government nor and 





Finally, our findings also have important implications for the discussion about the 
political consequences of ICT development and the power of Internet giants. With the 
Internet giants’ growing user base in China, and the contextual characteristics providing a 
relatively free environment for the collection and usage of user data, the giants may become 
even more powerful than their Western counterparts. People in the U.S. have already started 
to be aware of the potential of tech giants to be the new political power in Washington, while 
neither scholars nor the general public have paid sufficient attention to the potential of the 
Chinese Internet giants to be influential in the political arena (Solon & Siddiqui, 2017). 
Future studies could probe further into the power possessed by the Internet giants and their 
impacts in the society and the state. Beyond China, with the Chinese Internet giants’ global 
expansion and entry to the global market, research on their interaction with the government 
and the citizens of the countries where they set up new businesses can certainly shed light on 
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